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A Note on the Linkability of Blind Signature Schemes over Braid Groups

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Abstract- Blindness and unforgeability are two essential security requirements of a secure blind signature scheme. Blindness means that after interacting with various users, the signer can never be able to link a valid message pair. Blindness is meaningless if after interacting with various users, the signer is able to link a valid message signature pair. This security vulnerability is known as linkability attack. Recently, Verma proposed two blind signature schemes over braid groups. Verma claimed that the proposed schemes are secure against all possible security vulnerabilities and also satisfy all essential securities properties. This paper reviews Verma's proposed blind signature schemes and found that these scheme do not withstand against the linkability vulnerability.

Keywords- *Public key cryptography, Digital Signature Scheme, Public and Private key , Blind Signature Scheme.*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of blind digital signatures was first introduced by Chaum [1] in 1983 .Informally, a blind signature scheme is a protocol played by two parties in which a user obtains a signers signature for a desired message and the signer learns nothing about the message except its length. Blind signature is a key idea for constructing various anonymous electronic cash instruments. These are instruments for which the bank cannot trace where (and hence for what purpose) a user spends her/his electronic money. The security of blind signature scheme [4, 19, 21] should guarantee that only a valid authority of the bank can generate a valid signature and it is difficult for the user to forge a signature of any additional document, even after getting from the bank a number of blind signatures. Blindness (unlinkability) is also an essential property of blind signature.

Blindness (unlinkability) means after interacting with various users, the signer is not able to link a valid signature pair. With such properties, the blind signature schemes are useful in several applications such as electronic voting and electronic payment. Blindness is meaningless if any how after interacting with various users, the signer is able to link a valid message signature pair. This security vulnerability is known as linkability attack [14, 20, 15].

On the other side,within the last years several attempts have been made to derive cryptographic primitives from braid groups. These finitely presented groups are well-studied [12] and various proposals have been made for deriving cryptographic primitives from the conjugacy problem in these groups.

In 2000, Ko et. al. proposed a key agreement protocol and a public key encryption scheme based upon braid groups [17]. The schemes based upon braid groups [3,16] are analogous to the Diffie- Hellman key agreement scheme and the ElGamal encryption scheme on abelian groups. Their basic mathematical

problem is the Conjugacy Problem (CP) on braids: For a braid group B_n, we are asked to find a braid a from $u, b \in B_n$ satisfying $b = aua^{-1} \in B_n$. The security is based on the *Diffie-Hellman Conjugacy Problem* (**DHCP**) to find $baua^{-1}b^{-1} \in B_n$ for given $u, aua^{-1}, bub^{-1} \in B_n$ for a and b in two commuting subgroups of B_n respectively.

Verma [11] proposed two blind signature schemes over braid groups. Verma [11] claimed that the proposed schemes are secure against all possible security attacks and also satisfy all essential properties. This paper reviews Verma's proposed scheme and found that this scheme is vulnerable to linkability attack. This paper is organized as follows. Section - II provides a brief idea of braid groups. In section - III, we review Verma's blind signature scheme over braid groups. The securities vulnerabilities of Verma's proposed blind signature schemes are discussed in section - IV. Finally, we conclude the work in section V.

II. BRAID GROUPS

In this section, we give the basic definitions of braid groups and discuss some hard problems on those groups. For more information on braid groups, word problem and conjugacy problem, refer to the papers

[5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 17]. A braid is obtained by laying down a number of parallel strands and intertwining them so that they run in the same direction. For each integer $n \geq 2$, the *n*-braid group B_n is the group generated $\sigma_1\sigma_2 \ldots \ldots \ldots \sigma_{n-1}$ with the relations $\sigma_i\sigma_j = \sigma_j\sigma_i$ where $|i-j| \geq 2$ and $\sigma_i\sigma_{i+1}\sigma_i = \sigma_{i+1}\sigma_i\sigma_{i+1}$ otherwise. The number n is called the braid index and each element of B_n is called n - braid. Two

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braids *x* and *y* are said to be conjugate if there exist a braid a such that $= axa^{-1}$. For $m < n$, B_n can be considered as a subgroup of B_n generated by $\sigma_1\sigma_2 \dots \dots \dots \sigma_{m-1}$.

In Braid Cryptography, let G be a non-abelian group and $u, a, b, c \in G$. In order to perform the Diffie- Hellman key agreement on G, we need to choose *a*, *b* in G satisfying $ab = ba$ in the DHCP. Hence we introduce two commuting subgroups G_1, $G_2 \subset G$ satisfying $ab = ba$ for any $a \in G_1$, $b \in G_2$ .More precisely, the braid cryptography are based on the following decision problems.

• `Input`:

A non-abelian group , two commuting subgroups G_1, $G_2 \subset G$.

• `Conjugacy Problem` :

Given (u, aua^{-1}) with $u, a \in G$, compute a. (Note that if we denote aua^{-1} by u^a, it looks like the DLP.)

• `Diffie-Hellman Conjugacy Problem`:

Given (u, aua^{-1}, bub^{-1}) with $u, \in G, a, \in G_1\ b, \in G_2$, compute $baua^{-1}b^{-1}$.

•`Decisional Diffie-Hellman Conjugacy Problem`:

Given $(u, aua^{-1}, bub^{-1}, cuc^{-1})$ with $u, c \in G, a, \in G_1\ b, \in G2$, decide whether *c* = *ba*.

In braids, we can easily take two commuting subgroups G_1, $G_2 \subset G$ of B_n (For simplicity, we only consider a braid group with an even braid index. But it is easy to extend this to an odd braid index.). For example, $G_1 = LB_n$ (resp. $G_2 = RB_n$) is the subgroup of B_n consisting of braids made by braiding left $\frac{n}{2}$ strands (resp. right $\frac{n}{2}$ strands) among *n* strands. Thus LB_n is generated by $\sigma_1\sigma_2 \dots \dots \dots \sigma_{\frac{n}{2}-1}$ and RB_n is generated by $\sigma_{\frac{n}{2}-1}, \dots \sigma_{n-1}$. Then we have the commutative property that for any $a, \in G_1\ b, \in G_2$, $ab = ba$.

We choose a sufficiently complicated $(l + r) -$ braid $\alpha \in B_{l+r}$.Then following is a one-way function.

$$(f: G_1 \times G_n \rightarrow G_n \times G_n\ , f(a, x) = (axa^{-1}, x)$$

There is an efficient time algorithm [16] for a given pair (a, x) to compute axa^{-1}, but all the known attacks need exponential time to compute a from (axa^{-1}, x) . This one-way function is based on the difficulty of conjugacy problem.

III. Review of Verma's Blind Signature Schemes

This section reviews blind signature schemes over braid group [11]. The parameters n, l, d are fixed as in [17]. Let $m \in (0,1)^*$ be the message to be signed and $H: (0,1)^* \rightarrow B_n(l)$ be a one way hash function. Before involving in the signing processing, each user *u* does the following steps.

• Selects a braid $x_u \in_R B_n$ such that $x_u \in SSS(x_u)$.

• Choose $x_u^{'}, a_u \in_R RSSBG(x_u, d)$.

• Return public key as $pk = (x_u, x_u^{'})$ and secret key $sk = a_u$.

Now we are in a position to review Verma's blind signature schemes over braid group [11].

A. *Scheme I*

• BLINDING: The user selects $\alpha \in_r RB_n$ and computes $t = \alpha x \alpha^{-1}$,where $y = H(m)$ and sends *t* to signer.

• **Signing**: Signer computes $\sigma^{'} = ata^{-1}$ and sends back to the user.

• Unblinding: User computes $\sigma = \alpha^{-1}\sigma^{'}\alpha$ and then (σ, m) be the message signature pair.

• *Verification*: verifier accepts the signature if and only if $\sigma \sim y$ and $\sigma x_u^{'} \sim y\ x_u$.

B. *Scheme II*

• Signer chooses $(\alpha = bxb^{-1}, b) \in_R RSSBG(x, d)$ and sends α as a commitment.

• BLINDING: The user selects $\delta \in_r RB_n$ and computes $\alpha^{'} = \delta\alpha\delta^{-1}\ h = H(m \parallel \alpha^{'})$ and sends h to the signer.

• **Signing**: Signer computes and sends $\beta = bhb^{-1}$ and $\gamma = ba^{-1}hb^{-1}$ and sends β , γ back to the user.

• Unblinding: User computes $\beta^{'} = \delta\beta\delta^{-1}and\gamma^{'} = \delta\gamma\delta^{-1}$ and then $(\alpha^{'}, \beta^{'}, \gamma^{'}, m)$ is a signature on the message *m*.

• *Verification*: verifier accepts the signature $(\alpha^{'}, \beta^{'}, \gamma^{'}, m)$ if and only if $\alpha^{'} \sim x, \beta^{'} \sim h, \gamma^{'} \sim h, \alpha^{'}\ \beta^{'} \sim xh \quad \alpha^{'}\gamma^{'} \sim xh$.

IV. Security Analysis of Verma's Proxy Blind Signature Schemes over Braid Groups

This section analyzes the security of blind signature schemes over braid group [11]. This section proves that both the proposed schemes do not satisfy the unlinkability property, which one of the essential security requirement of a secure blind signature scheme. In both the proposed scheme, after interacting with various users the signer is able to link a valid message signature pair. This attack is known as linkability attack.

A. *Linkability Attack of Scheme-I*

In the scheme-I, during the interactive protocol execution between the signer and user, the signature (σ, m) is generated. For the signer, in order to establish a link between revealed message and blind information, the signer records owned all the generated information, such as $\sigma_i^{'}, t_i$. After the signature (σ_i, m_i) is revealed , the signer executes the following steps:

1. Set the value t_i.
2. Select a valid signature pair (σ_i, m_i).
3. Computes $y_i =, H(m_i)$.
4. Check the conjugacy relation$(t_i \sim y_i)$, if it is hold , go to next step, otherwise go to step-I and set a

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different value of t_i.

5. Check the conjugacy relation $t_i \sim \sigma_i$, if it is holds ,it means the singer has managed to link a valid signature (σ_i, m_i) with the blind information t_i.

In the Scheme-I, since $t_i \sim \alpha_i y_i \alpha_i^{-1}$, $\sigma_i^{-1} = a_i t_i a_i^{-1}$ and $\sigma_i \sim \alpha_i^{-1} \sigma_i' \alpha_i$,therefore every selected t_i will only be mapped on its corresponding y_i and σ_i. In this way, the Verma's (scheme I) blind signature over braid group [11] is vulnerable to linkability attack and the signer is able to link a valid signature (σ_i, m_i) with the blind information t_i.

B. *Linkability attack of scheme-i*I

In the scheme-II, during the interactive protocol execution between the signer and user, $(\alpha', \beta', \gamma', m)$ is a valid signature on the message *m*. For the signer, in order to establish a link between revealed message and blind information, the signer records owned all the generated information. After the signature is revealed , the signer executes the following steps:

1. Set the value α_i.
2. Select a valid signature pair $(\alpha_i', \beta_i', \gamma_i', m_i)$.
3. Computes $y_i = , H(m_i)$.
4. Check the conjugacy relation $\alpha_i \sim \alpha_i'$, if it is holdgo to next step, otherwise go to step-1 and set a different value of α_i.
5. Set the value β_i.
6. Check the conjugacy relation $\beta_i \sim \beta_i'$, ,if it is hold go to next step, otherwise go back to step-4 and set a different value of β_i.
7. Set the value $\gamma_{i.}$
8. Check the conjugacy relation $\gamma_i \sim \gamma_i'$, if it holds it means the singer has managed to link a valid signature pair, otherwise go back to step-5 and set a different value of $\gamma_{i.}$.

In the Scheme-II, $\alpha_i = b_i x b_i^{-1}$, $\beta_i = b_i h_i b_i^{-1}$ and $\gamma_i = b_i a_i^{-1} h_i b_i^{-1}$.On the otherside, $\alpha_i' = \delta_i \alpha_i \delta_i^{-1}$,$\beta_i' = \delta_i \beta_i \delta_i^{-1}$and $\gamma_i' = \delta_i \gamma_i \delta_i^{-1}$. It can be observed easily that every selected transcription $(\alpha', \beta', \gamma', m)$ will only be mapped on its corresponding transcription $(\alpha_i', \beta_i', \gamma_i', m_i)$. In this way, the Verma's II blind signature over braid group [11] is vulnerable to linkability attack and the signer is able to link a valid message signature $(\alpha_i', \beta_i', \gamma_i', m_i)$ with the blind information $(\alpha', \beta', \gamma')$.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has reviewed the security of Verma's blind signature schemes over braid groups. In Verma's scheme the signer is able to link the blind information to a valid revealed signature pair. The discussion has proved that the proposed scheme does not satisfy the unlinkability/blindness property, which one of the essential security requirement of a blind signature scheme.

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